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Abstract — This paper provides an overview of “Wireless and Mobile Security” course. 
The course o ers practical study of security issues and features concerning wireless security. 
The program of the course e  ciently interleaves systematic theoretical knowledge and prac-
tical work. The theoretical part of the course includes basic information about the architec-
ture of wireless networks, as well as available in this area to modern standards and protection 
mechanisms built into the equipment for wireless networks. It is also proposed an e ective 
method for integrating a wireless network with the existing network infrastructure, taking 
into account all aspects of security. More than 50 percent of teaching time is devoted to prac-
tical work on the protection of wireless networks.
During the course skills to work with software NetStumbler, Kismet, AirSnort, Aircrack, 
and other monitoring wireless and network tools will be acquired. Particular attention is 
paid to the use of the most common tools of audit wireless networks, both commercial, and 
open source. In conclusion, a comprehensive approach to wireless security will be o ered 
for each wireless technology.
Keywords: Wireless Network; Wireless Security; Wireless Threats; Arduino IDE; Bluetooth; 
DECT; ZigBee; Rogue Access Point; RADIUS; WPA; WPA2; AES; TKIP; PEAP; TTLS; EAP-FAST; 
PololuWixel; Access Point, Spectrum Analyzer.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless and mobile networks are rapidly extending their capabilities. One of the most 
bene cial features of wireless networks is that they support user mobility in a convenient 
way. The downside is that wireless networks are more susceptible to attacks than their 
wired counterparts. This increased vulnerability mainly stems from the lack of physical con-
nections and the broadcast nature of radio communications. It is, therefore, important to 
provide appropriate security measures for wireless networks, which ensure the robustness 
of their operation even in case of malicious attacks.
In practice, many companies and organizations still use and deploy vulnerable wireless gear, 
often in their default con gurations. This is most often due to poor security awareness or a lack 
of understanding of the risks and rami cations. Home computer users and businesses that lack 
security are putting themselves at risk of many serious problems, including (but not limited to):
• Identity theft and all the problems caused by it.
• Corruption of important  les and data, installing viruses, etc.
• Other people reading your private details and information.
• Stealing of credit card numbers, bank account details and secure information.
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• Large bills for the download of huge amounts of data
by other people.
• Being reported for the download of illegal or copy-
righted materials.
• Having your computer used as a part of a network to
attack others.
• Handing control of your computer to those with un-
welcome agendas.
Early wireless networks heavily leaned on Virtual Pri-
vate Networks to provide Layer 3 security, which — aside 
from the additional overhead of encapsulation and chal-
lenges of roaming, Quality of Service, client support and 
scalability  — left the IP network vulnerable to attacks.
Today current security features are ine ective, costly, 
or non-Universal. Home users want something they can 
 gure out that works without having to purchase any-
thing extra. Network administrators also consider cost, 
but their primary concern has to be making the network 
available to most of their users while still o ering authen-
tication and protection from intruders.
The goal of the course in “Wireless and Mobile Securi-
ty” is to provide an overview of what is required to provide 
a  secure communication channel in a  wireless environ-
ment. The focus is on the security techniques available for 
wireless local area networks and for wireless devices used 
to access the Internet. This course assists in understanding 
wireless security requirements and their implementation.
A non-exhaustive list of topics to be taught includes:
• Security basics of the wireless network;
• Wireless data collection and Wi-Fi MAC analysis;
• Wireless tools and Information analysis;
• Client, crypto, and enterprise attacks;
• Bluetooth, DECT and ZigBee attacks;
• Advanced Wi-Fi attack techniques;
• Wireless security strategies, and implementation;
• Protection methods in mobile technologies.
Also, the purpose of the course is to provide knowledge
in the security architecture of wireless and mobile com-
munication systems, information threats models, vulnera-
bilities and protection abilities in wireless networks. After 
the course in “Wireless Security” the students will obtain 
practical skills in penetration testing of wireless networks 
and using various protection methods and will be able to:
• Design a wireless infrastructure;
• Choose wireless con guration;
• Create security policies;
• Set permissions rankings;
• Conduct an audit of the service network;
• Match the current network with other wired and wire-
less networks;
• Ensure the availability and scalability of the wireless
network;
• Protect a mobile device and communication channels
against cyberattacks.
So, the main contributions of the course in “Wireless
and Mobile Security” are summarized as follows. Firstly, 
in this course a review of security threats and vulnerabi-
lities at di erent protocol layers and commencing from 
the physical layer up to the application layer is pre-
sented,. Secondly, the family of security protocols and 
algorithms used in the existing wireless networks are 
summarized, such as the Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, WiMAX, and 
Long-Term Evolution (LTE) standards. Additionally, course 
provides a  review on various wireless sni ers and tools 
as well as their detection and prevention techniques 
and proposes some of the open challenges in wireless 
security.
A. Security Basics of the Wireless Network
Security is especially important for Wi-Fi wireless
networks. Hackers can easily intercept wireless network 
tra  c over open air connections and extract information 
like passwords and credit card numbers. Several Wi-Fi 
network security technologies have been developed to 
combat hackers, of course, although some of these tech-
nologies can be defeated relatively easily.
As wireless communication and the Internet become 
truly interoperable, users will want this communica-
tion channel to be secure and available when needed. 
For  a  message sent using this communication channel, 
the user expects assurance of:
• Authentication (the sender and receiver are who they
say they are).
• Con dentiality (the message cannot be understood
except by the receiver).
• Integrity (the message was not altered).
The goal of this course is to provide an overview of
what is required to provide a secure communication chan-
nel in a wireless environment. The focus is on the securi-
ty techniques available for Wireless Local Area Networks 
(WLAN) and for wireless devices (e.g. cell phones and 
PDA’s) used to access the Internet.
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Wireless networking provides many advantages but 
it is also coupled with new security threats and alters the 
organization’s overall information security risk pro le. Al-
though implementation of technological solutions is the 
usual response to wireless security threats and vulnera-
bilities, wireless security is primarily a  management 
issue. Effective management of the threats associated 
with wireless technology requires a  sound and 
thorough assessment of risk given the environment and 
development of a  plan to mitigate identifi ed threats.
The wireless networks consist of such basic 
com-ponents: the transmission of data using radio 
frequencies; access points that provide a  connection 
to the organizational network and/or the client’s 
devices (laptops, PDAs, etc.) and users. Each of these 
components provides an avenue for attack that can 
result in the compromise of one or more of the 
three fundamen-tal security objectives of confi 
dentiality, integrity, and availability.
Wireless Threats. Wireless networks are exposed to 
various threats and vulnerabilities. Wireless net-
works are vulnerable because of their open medi-
um nature. The networks have dynamically changing 
topology and also there is no centralized monitoring 
and management. Generally, a  threat model is used 
to classify threats or attacks. The attacks are classified 
into two categories namely passive attacks and active 
attacks.
Passive Attacks. Passive attacks are those 
attacks that only snoop the traffic without modifying 
the data or traffic between the two nodes. In this the 
attacker does not disrupt the normal routine, but 
only tries to gather valuable information from 
snooping the traffic. Examples of passive attacks are 
Eavesdropping, Man-in-the-Middle attack, Traffic 
Analysis etc. Active attack categories are WEP key 
cracking, evil twin AP and AP phishing, etc.
Active attacks. Active attacks are those attacks that 
either modi es the data being exchanged or dropping of 
packets in network. Following are a list of active attacks 
in WLAN technology: Unauthorized Access, Rogue Ac-
cess Point, Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM), Denial-of- 
Service, Reply Attack, Session Hijacking.
   Fig. 1. Attacks on WLANs
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Attacks on WLANs
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There are also attacks against the various layers of 
TCP/IP protocol stack. The attacks can be shown as fol-
lows (see Table I).
Table I. Attacks against the various layers of 
OSI model
Layer Attacks
Application DoS, WORM, CSRF, SQL, Injection, 
Viruses
Transport Session hijacking, covert channel
Network Black hole, Byzantine, Wormhole, 
Rushing, Sybil
MAC layer Signal jamming, sniffing
Application layer: 
The application layer is responsible for running the 
services. The attacks that are made against this layer 
are Denial of Service, executing malicious code, worms, 
etc. The defense mechanism for this layer is proper 
maintenance of sequence numbers and also maintain-
ing the routing information to avoid denial of service.
Transport layer:
The transport layer is vulnerable to session hi-
jacking which can lead to an attacker taking over the 
session of a  legitimate user and perform malicious 
actions. Another attack is the covert channel, i.e. hid-
ing information in network header and using a  chan-
nel for communication that goes undiscoverable. The 
defense mechanisms for the session hijacking are 
change of session ІD immediately after logging into 
a session. 
Network layer: 
The attacks on network layer mainly involve the at-
tacks on the various routing protocols used in ad hoc 
networks such as Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vec-
tor (AODV) protocol and the Dynamic Source Routing 
(DSR) protocol. The various attacks taking place on these 
routing protocols are Black hole, Byzantine, Sybil and 
Wormhole attacks. These attacks are discussed in detail 
further. 
MAC layer: 
The attacks on MAC layer are associated with the 
channel allocation for the wireless medium. Various at-
tacks such as signal jamming can lead to denial of service. 
Sni  ng can lead to modi cation of the packets being 
transferred in the wireless medium. To avoid sni  ng pack-
ets can be encrypted at the sender side and decrypted at 
the receiver side. There are various encryption techniques 
and the standards being used include WPA and WEP. 
Multi-layer:
The attacks that occur in any layer of the network 
protocol stack come under this category. The attacks in-
cluded are spoo ng attacks, denial of service attack etc.
This section mainly focuses on:
• Wireless impact on traditional security approaches;
• Signal exposure threats;
• Common misconceptions in wireless security;
• Wireless LAN and MAN signal leakage;
• Information disclosure threats;
• DoS attacks;
• Rogue AP attacks;
• Wireless protocol de ciencies;
• Anonymity attacks;
• Home user threats.
Thus, in the  rst part of the course, all existing attacks
in wireless networks will be analyzed.
In addition, the following issues will be discussed:
• Wireless standards bodies, role of the WiFi Alliance for
interoperability testing, capabilities and features of
WPA and WPA2, IETF standards, RADIUS, and EAP pro-
tocols.
• Enterprise impact of security-pertinent wireless stand-
ards including: 802.11z “Direct Link Setup”, 802.11ac
“Gigabit over Wi-Fi”, 802.11af “Wi-Fi in TV White Space”.
• Information about standards bodies work and working 
group resources.
As a  result, the  rst section of the course “Wireless
and Mobile Security” will cover all the principles of wire-
less LAN organizations, standards and the wireless threats.
Also, the risks and threats using BYOD will be dis-
cussed, as it can lead to data breaches and increased lia-
bility for the organization.
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B. Wireless LAN Assessment Techniques
The second section of the course will present the
important question of the wireless LAN assessment tech-
niques.
In fact, companies should conduct regular, perio dic 
security reviews to ensure that changes to the WLAN 
don’t make the system vulnerable to hackers. A  review 
once each year may su  ce for low risk networks, but a re-
view each quarter or more often may be necessary if the 
network supports high risk information (e.g.,  nancial 
data, postal mail routing, manufacturing control func-
tions, etc.).
When performing a  wireless LAN security assess-
ment, consider completing the following steps:
1. Review existing security policies.
2. Review the system architecture and con gurations.
3. Review operational support tools and procedures.
4. Interview users.
5. Verify con gurations of wireless devices.
6. Investigate physical installations of access points.
7. Identify rogue access points.
8. Perform penetration tests.
9. Analyze security gaps.
10. Recommend improvements.
In the course di erent methods and analysis for
a  WLAN audit will be discussed. For example, the appli-
cation of the method of  ngerprinting is associated with 
the fact that identifying devices connected to a network 
(i.e.,  device  ngerprinting) has become of critical impor-
tance to ensure, among other security services, access 
control to the network. In the same vein, there has also 
been a  need to understand the type of a  device that is 
connected to a  network (i.e., device type  ngerprint-
ing). Device  ngerprinting seeks to uniquely identify de-
vices on a  network without considering existing easily 
forgeable identi ers (e.g., IP and MAC addresses). On the 
other hand, device type  ngerprinting can be used to 
determine if a device belongs to a particular cohort. This 
method includes three categories: OS  ngerprinting, host 
 ngerprinting, and device type/driver  ngerprinting.
The following WLAN assessment techniques will be 
described: client post-processing analysis with Kismet 
XML  les, identifying the authentication and encryption 
options used on the WLAN with Kismet and Wireshark, 
techniques for mapping the range of indoor and outdoor 
WLANs, assessing tra  c captured in monitor mode for 
information disclosure, identifying multicast protocols 
with MAC analysis, evaluating encrypted tra  c and pro-
prietary encryption functions, etc.
After the course the students will have a full under-
standing of the Rogue AP Analysis (Fig. 2.).
Rogue AP Analyse includes:
De ning and understanding rogue networks
How attackers exploit rogue networks
Types of rogue networks
Examples of malicious Rogue AP 
compromises
Ad-hoc rogue networks
Windows bridging and the Ad-hoc threat
SOHO devices as a node threat, threat of 
Windows soft APs
Behavior and spread of the "Free Public 
Wi-Fi" ad-hoc networks
   Fig. 2. Rogue AP analysis
Based on the analysis, di erent techniques will be 
o ered for identifying rogue devices (such as: wired-side
AP  ngerprinting, wired-side MAC pre x analysis, wire-
less-side warwalking, wireless-side client monitoring,
wireless-side IDS, Nmap rogue AP scripting analysis) and
for preventing rogue APs (Fig. 3).
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Establish strict rules and 
make sure they are well 
published
Change the rogue 
classi cation rules
Eliminate benign access 
points from the rogue list so 
that real rogues stand out
Add known intruders 
to the rogue list Use strong security
Use active access points 
scanning in addition to 
passive scanning
Make sure the Juniper 
wireless signature is 
enabled and change it on 
a regular basis
Make sure logging is 
enabled and check log 
messages and traps for 
suspicious activity
Immediately investigate 
wireless bridge frames and 
eliminate the sourse
Consider using static IP 
addresses instead of having 
them assigned by a DHCP 
server
Use managed switches on 
your network and use their 
port-based security to allow 
only certain MAC addresses 
or disable unused ports
Immediately investigate 
ad-hoc access points and 
either add security to them 
or eliminate them
Fig. 3. Preventing rogue access points
Currently, there is already a number of di erent me-
thods of protection:
• Encryption protocol WEP;
• WPA encryption protocol;
• WPA2 protocol;
• 802.1X security standard;
• Filtering by MAC address;
• Hiding the SSID;
• Denying access to the settings of the access point or
router through the wireless network.
However, there is no di  culty in overcoming a wireless 
network security system Therefore, it is necessary to use 
a comprehensive approach to protect a wireless network. 
For this, the course will consider all methods of protection, 
starting with methods from Client, Crypto, Enterprise and 
 nishing Advanced attack.
С. Client, Crypto, Enterprise, and Advanced 
Attacks
If in a  wireless network of small dimensions using 
standard security methods is usually enough, in large net-
works, it is necessary to use a more thorough approach to 
security issues.
For a  more detailed understanding of Enterprise 
attacks, the course will look in detail at the following 
issues:
• Understanding the risks and challenges of legacy au-
thentication sources, how PEAP addresses this weak-
ness using TLS.
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• Understanding TLS tunnel establishment exchange
and validation, behavior of PEAP Phase 1 and PEAP
Phase 2 connections, identity disclosure in PEAP sup-
plicants.
• Di erences between WPA2-PSK and WPA-Enterprise
authentication, EAPOL-Key distribution and use, PMK
generation and delivery from RADIUS, PTK derivation
and key rotation mechanisms.
• Attacks against PEAP networks including authenti-
cation attacks, Man-In-The-Middle attacks, EAPOL
key-distribution attacks, client-speci c attacks.
• Exploiting weaknesses in certi cate validation mecha-
nisms in Windows, Apple iOS, and Android platforms.
• Protecting PEAP networks, WZC recommended suppli-
cant con guration properties, mitigating PEAP user-
name disclosure with third-party supplicants, client
 rewall devices and wireless security recommenda-
tions.
Advanced Wi-Fi attack techniques are discussed in
more detail. The most compatible wireless hardware con-
 gurations nowadays are WPA + WPA2 Mixed Mode, WPA-
TKIP, WPA2-AES and WPA-AES, WPA2-TKIP.
D. Wireless Security Strategies
and Implementation
The main goals of the course in “Wireless and Mobile 
Security” is to provide modern methods and techniques 
of preventing di erent types of existing attacks. Part of 
these methods are using Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS)/Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). The WIDS is the 
software that detects an attack on a wireless network or 
wireless system. A network IDS (NIDS) is designed to sup-
port multiple hosts, whereas a host IDS (HIDS) is set up to 
detect illegal actions within the host. Most IDS programs 
typically use signatures of known cracker attempts to sig-
nal an alert. Others look for deviations of the normal rou-
tine as indications of an attack.
1. WIDS Deployment Models:
WIDS deployment models can classify by three 
WIDS model categories: overlay deployment, integrated 
deployment, and hybrid deployment.
WIDS overlay deployment model (Fig. 4) has next 
advantages and disadvantages.
Advantages:
1. Ability to deploy a monitoring solution that is sepa-
rate from the wireless transport provider.
2. The organization can leverage the overlay WIDS prod-
uct to monitor for the vulnerability, if a vulnerability is 
discovered in the transport network implementation
equipment.
3. Allowing organizations to monitor for the presence of 
unauthorized wireless devices.
Disadvantages:
1. Cost.
2. Organizations must deploy wireless sensor devices in
all areas that require WIDS monitoring.
3. The lack of integration with the transport network
can constrain the analysis capabilities of the overlay
model.
The sensors passively listen to the events on the wire-
less network and use various analysis techniques to iden-
tify attacks.
   Fig. 4. Overlay WIDS Example, where AM — 
Air Monitors, AP — Access Point
2. WIDS integrated deployment model:
By using WIDS integrated deployment model the 
access point operates as both a  transport provider, 
and a  WIDS sensor, identifying and reporting attacks.
WIDS integrated deployment model characterizes 
the following advantages and disadvantages.
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Advantages:
1. More cost-e ective solution for organizations.
2. Has knowledge of dynamic encryption keys.
Disadvantages:
1. The lack of resources.
2. Must provide service and analysis capabilities, re-
stricting the AP’s ability to devote available CPU and
memory resources to monitoring tasks.
3. Constrain to monitoring the frequency for which it is
servicing users.
   Fig. 5. Integrated WIDS Example, where Dual-purpose 
AP/ AM devices
3. WIDS Hybrid Deployment Model:
WIDS Hybrid Deployment Model uses both dual-pur-
pose APs and dedicated AMs for intrusion detection and 
protection. Analysis is performed by a centralized control-
ler similar to what is used with an overlay model, rather 
than the approach used in an integrated WIDS deploy-
ment, where processing is handled by distributed access 
points.
Advantages:
1. Increased  exibility in deployment.
2. Focused analysis mechanisms.
3. More comprehensive attack detection.
4. Powerful response mechanisms.
5. Using a  centralized access controller that integrates
an identity-based ICSA-certi ed  rewall.
Disadvantages:
1. Cost.
2. The lack of resources.
   Fig. 6. Integrated WIDS example, where Dual-purpose 
AP/ AM devices
Methods for detection of attacks in modern Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDS) not su  ciently elaborated in 
terms of the formal model of attacks, and for them it is 
quite di  cult to strictly evaluate properties such as com-
putational complexity, accuracy, etc. Intrusion detection 
methods are divided into methods for anomaly detec-
tion and misuse detection methods. The second type of 
methods are most of today’s commercial systems (Cisco 
IPS, ISS RealSecure, NFR) — they use a signature (expert) 
detection methods. There are a lot of academic research-
es in the  eld of anomaly detection, but in industrial ap-
plications, they are used sparingly and with great cau-
tion, as  these systems generate a  large number of false 
posit ives. For expert systems the main problem is the low 
e  ciency of detecting unknown attacks (adaptability). 
Low adaptability still remains a  problem, although such 
advantages as a  low computational complexity and low 
cost deployment of such systems determine dominance 
in this area.
4. Methods of Intrusion Detection:
In this section of the course the following criteria 
were selected for the comparative analysis of intrusion 
detection methods:
The level of system monitoring. This criterion deter-
mines the level of abstraction of the analyzed events in 
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the protected system, and determines the limits of appli-
cability of the method for the detection of attacks on net-
works. The following levels are considered in this review:
• HIDS — Host-based IDS.
• NIDS — Network-based IDS.
• AIDS — Application-based IDS.
 • Hybrid — A combination of di erent levels of observer.
Veri ability of the method. This criterion allows to
evaluate whether a person can (for example, a skilled ope-
rator of IDS or expert) to reproduce the sequence of steps 
for the adoption of a decision on the presence of an attack 
by comparing the input and output of IDS. For example, 
signature-based methods will be considered veri a ble, 
and clustered  — not. Veri a bility allows the correctness 
of the method and its implementation at any given time 
for peer review. The property of this method is important 
to the operation of the intrusion detection system in real 
environment as a means of gathering evidence about the 
attacks.
Adaptive methods. Assessment of the stability of 
the method to small changes in the implementation of 
the attacks, which do not change the result of the attack. 
Adaptability is the only signi c ant a dvantage o f “ alter-
native” methods of detection of attacks before 
“signaturebased”. Lack of adaptability does not allow 
protection system to respond quickly to unknown 
attacks and requires the organization of the system 
some regular up-dating databases of known attacks, 
similar to antivirus systems.
Stability. Output method does not depend on the 
protected system. The stability problem is acute for sta-
tistical methods that analyze the absolute values of the 
parameters of performance and utilization of network 
resources and components. Trained in the same network 
recognizer can be sustained in this network, and unsta-
ble in all other networks. This stability will be called lo-
cal. Since learning is usually an “expensive” procedure 
because it requires the use of large amounts of resourc-
es and time, the number of training procedures should 
be minimized. Methods for detection of attacks, analyz-
ing the input semantics, are more stable than statistics.
Computational complexity. The complexity of this 
method of analysis is considered in the acquisition mode, 
without taking into account the possible preliminary stag-
es of setup and training. This criterion is a  key problem 
for intrusion detection in telecommunication networks. 
Complexity Estimation is sublinear, linear, quadratic, etc.
Based on the comparative analysis it can be conclud-
ed that none of the above open IDS does fully conform 
to the criteria of the “ideal” IDS. The main disadvantage 
is the lack of adaptability to unknown attacks and the 
inability to analyze the behavior of objects in a  tele-
communications network at the same time, at all levels.
Based on the analysis and identi ed disadvantage 
the requirements have been developed for modern 
IDS [6–9] that can be put into the development of a hy-
brid adaptive intrusion detection method based on 
signature analysis and state transition. It requires to:
• Cover all classes of attacks.
• Allow to analyze the behavior of the telecommunica-
tions network to be protected at all levels: network,
nodes, and the level of individual applications.
• Be adaptable to unknown attacks (using an adaptive
method of intrusion detection).
• Scale to telecommunications networks of di erent
classes (from small local networks of class “home of-
 ce” to large multi-segment and switched enterprise
networks, providing centralized management of all
IDS components).
• Have integrated mechanisms to respond to an attack.
 • Be protected against attacks on IDS components, in-
cluding interception control or attacks “denial of service”.
• Be open.
So, the role of intrusion detection systems for infor-
mation security has increased steadily. The cost of systems 
and the cost of exploitation for commercial IDS is very high. 
Given the growing popularity of open source software and 
its signi cantly lower cost, it appears that the role of free 
IDS will grow even faster.
Organizations should consider using multiple types of 
IDPS technologies to achieve more comprehensive and ac-
curate detection and prevention of malicious activity. For 
most environments, a  combination of network-based and 
host-based IDPSs is needed for an e ective IDS solution. 
Wireless IDPSs may also be needed if the organization deter-
mines that its wireless networks need additional monitor-
ing or if the organization wants to ensure that rogue wire-
less networks are not in use in the organization’s facilities. 
The course identi es deploying a  secure wireless 
infrastructure, con guring and securing wireless clients:
• Recommendations for managing an authentication ar-
chitecture, leveraging the RADIUS protocol for authen-
tication validation, RADIUS data encoding rules, EAP
transmitted over RADIUS.
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• Understanding the impact of a compromised CA, “evil
twin” attack.
• Recommendations and preferences for selecting an
EAP type, understanding the advantages and disad-
vantages of EAP/TLS, PEAP, PEAPv1, PEAPv2, TTLS, EAP-
FAST, PEAP-EAP-TLS.
• Four techniques for deploying a  new root certi -
cate authority: manual, web-server delivery, script-
ed web-server delivery, automatic trust with GPO.
• Managing client con guration settings with Windows,
cached authentication credentials with PEAP on Win-
dows WZC, deploying GPO settings for preferred wire-
less network, specifying the con guration and settings 
of preferred WZC networks, editing and implementing
wireless-speci c GPO policies, recommendations for
securing PEAP through GPO.
• Managing third-part wireless manager tools with the
Funk Odyssey supplicant, creating a  custom installer
with Odyssey manager.
Besides security in Wi-Fi network, Protection methods
in Bluetooth, DECT, and ZigBee and Mobile technologies 
are also reviewed in the course.
E. Practical Skills in the Course
in “Wireless and Mobile Security”
During the course, students acquire the skills to work
with software NetStumbler, Kismet, AirSnort, aircrack and 
other wireless network monitoring tools. Particular atten-
tion is paid to the use of the most common tools of audit 
wireless networks, both commercial and open source. 
The main topics for practice are listed below:
1. Wireless Network Mapping: 
The purpose of this practice is to obtain data on wire-
less networks and visualize the relationships between the 
elements. 
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Collect data about wireless devices and their geoloca-
tion.
• Write a small Python scripts for data conversion.
• Make a wireless network mapping.
• Build a “client to access point” and “client to probe” re-
lationship graphs.
• Use GPS module in wireless network scanning.
• Parse airodump-ng results and to export its as JSON.
• Make a  GPS track on Google maps (for independent
work).
2. Monitor Network Tra  c:
The purpose of this practice is to collect wireless net-
work data using sni er and analyze this data on vulnera-
bilities.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Choose a sni er for the monitoring of network tra  c.
• Restrict on packet processing.
• Collect data from network sni er.
• Write their own sni er based on external tools.
3. WEP and WPS Hacking Technologies: 
The purpose of this practice is to consider the com-
mon methods of hacking Wi-Fi networks.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Conduct attacks on Wi-Fi.
• Set up wireless access point based on known vulner-
abilities.
• Test an AP on WEP and WPS vulnerabilities.
• Disable insecure services.
4. Research of Radio Frequency Wi-Fi Resources 
in 2.4–2.5 GHz Range: 
The purpose of this practice is to consider di erent 
ways to obtain information about the radiation levels in 
wireless networks without the use of special spectrum 
analyzers.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Know ways to obtain information about the energy uti-
lization of channels.
• Know how to get workload of the frequency range.
• Use a mobile phone to receive a list of available wire-
less networks.
• Determine the workload channel.
• In this practice there are two types of spectrum ana-
lyzers used:
• Fourier analyzer (FFT analyzer).
• Analyzers operating in accordance with the hetero-
dyne principle.
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In the course a lot of spectrum analyzers for the 2.4–2.5 
GHz ISM band will be implemented to connect via USB-in-
terface (FFT analyzer). For example, Ubiquiti AirView2, 
MetaGeek Wi-Spy, Wi-Detector, as well as on the basis of 
di erent sets of debugging (such as TI eZ430-RF2500) or 
network interface cards (e.g., Atheros AR92xx and AR93xx 
with Spectral Scan mode [3]). These devices have a num-
ber of drawbacks: the price; the di  culty of obtaining data 
that are usually tied to a particular program; the inability 
to change the  rmware of devices. In addition, there are 
of course many homemade projects, usually based on TI 
CC2500 chip and Cypress 693x, as well as modules on their 
basis.
5. Wi-Fi Fuzzing:
The purpose of this practice is to make fuzz testing 
of wireless access point and to conduct security analysis 
of the part of PCI DSS standard that is responsible for the 
wireless network.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Know di erent ways of Wi-Fi fuzzing.
• Know wireless part of PCI DSS standard.
• Make a fuzz testing of an AP.
• Security analysis of AP in accordance with PCI DSS
standard.
Fuzz testing or fuzzing is a black box software testing
technique, which basically consists in  nding implemen-
tation bugs using malformed/semi-malformed data injec-
tion in an automated fashion.
A  fuzzer is a  program which injects automatical-
ly semi-random data into a  program/stack and detects 
bugs. The data-generation part is made of generators, 
and vulnerability identi cation relies on debugging tools. 
Generators usually use combinations of static fuzzing 
vectors (known-to-be-dangerous values), or totally ran-
dom data. New generation fuzzers use genetic algorithms 
to link injected data and observed impact. Such tools are 
not public yet.
6. Wi-Fi Network DoS Attacks:
The purpose of this practice is to consider DoS ways 
to attack the Wi-Fi network.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Know types of DoS attacks on the Wi-Fi network.
• Know typical signs of DoS attack.
• Test an AP by DoS attacking.
• Get an answer on the status of running AP.
A  denial of service (DoS) occurs when a  system is
not providing services to authorized clients because of 
resource exhaustion by unauthorized clients. In wire-
less networks, DoS attacks are di  cult to prevent, di  -
cult to stop an on-going attack; the victim and its clients 
may not even detect the attacks. The duration of such 
DoS may range from milliseconds to hours. A DoS attack 
against an individual station enables session hijacking.
Jamming the air waves. A  number of consumer ap-
pliances such as microwave ovens, baby monitors, and 
cordless phones operate on the unregulated 2.4 GHz ra-
dio frequency. An attacker can unleash large amounts of 
noise using these devices and jam the airwaves so that 
the signal to noise drops so low, that the wireless LAN 
ceases to function. The only solution to this is RF proo ng 
the surrounding environment.
Flooding with associations. The AP inserts the data 
supplied by the station in the Association Request into 
a table called the association table that the AP maintains 
in its memory. The IEEE 802.11 speci es a maximum value 
of 2007 concurrent associations to an AP. The actual size 
of this table varies among di erent models of APs. When 
this table over ows, the AP would refuse further clients. 
Having cracked WEP, an attacker authenticates several 
non-existing stations using legitimate-looking but ran-
domly generated MAC addresses. The attacker then sends 
a  ood of spoofed associate requests so that the associa-
tion table over ows. Enabling MAC  ltering in the AP will 
prevent this attack.
Forged dissociation. The attacker sends a spoofed Dis-
association frame where the source MAC address is set to 
that of the AP. The station is still authenticated but needs 
only to reassociate and sends Reassociation Requests 
to the AP. The AP may send a  Reassociation Response 
accepting the station and the station can then resume 
sending data. To prevent Reassociation the attacker con-
tinues to send Disassociation frames for a desired period.
Forged deauthentication. The attacker monitors all 
raw frames collecting the source and destination MAC 
addresses to verify that they are among the targeted vic-
tims. When a  data or Association Response frame is ob-
served, the attacker sends a  spoofed Deauthentication 
frame where the source MAC address is spoofed to that 
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of the AP. The station is now unassociated and unauthen-
ticated, and needs to reconnect. To prevent a reconnec-
tion, the attacker continues to send Deauthentication 
frames for a  desired period. The attacker may even rate 
the limit of the Deauthentication frames to avoid over-
loading the already congested network. The mischievous 
packets of Disassociation and Deauthentication are sent 
directly to the client, so these will not be logged by the 
AP or IDS, and neither MAC  ltering nor WEP protection 
will prevent it.
Obviously, the primary thing they can do is to force 
stations (clients) o  of a given network, causing a DoS at-
tack. It can also use death attacks to reveal otherwise hid-
den SSIDs (not included in beacon frames) by disconnect-
ing the clients, and then monitoring for Probe Requests 
which always contain the SSID.
7. Over the Air (OTA)
The purpose of this practice is to check the  rmware 
updates over the network; to analyze the data transmit-
ted over the network during the upgrade; to investigate 
the possibility of substitution of transferred  rmware.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Know principles of OTA.
• Know weak spots of OTA.
• Create the  rmware.
• Provide online  rmware.
OTA update is the process of loading the  rmware
to ESP module using Wi-Fi connection rather that a serial 
port. Such functionality became extremely useful in case 
of limited or no physical access to the module.
OTA may be done using:
• Arduino IDE.
• Web Browser.
• HTTP Server.
Arduino IDE option is intended primarily for software
development phase. The two other options would be more 
useful after deployment, to provide module with applica-
tion updates manually with a web browser or automatical-
ly using a http server.
In any case  rst  rmware upload has to be done over 
a serial port. If OTA routines are correctly implemented in 
a sketch, then all subsequent uploads may be done over 
the air.
There is no imposed security on OTA process from be-
ing hacked. It is up to developer to ensure that updates 
are allowed only from legitimate / trusted sources. Once 
update is complete, module restarts and new code is exe-
cuted. Developer should ensure that application running 
on module is shut down and restarted in a safe manner. 
Chapters below provide additional information regarding 
security and safety of OTA process.
8. Research of Stress Loading of Wireless Network:
The purpose of this practice is to assemble a sample 
of the test access point based on single-board computer; 
to explore one of the security aspects of wireless infra-
structure — availability.
After the study, the students must know and be able 
to:
• Restrict imposed on the wireless infrastructure.
• Know methods of collecting system information in OS
Linux.
• Establish basic network services for wireless access
points in OS Linux.
• Work with the indicator displays (OLED).
Availability is ensuring that authorized users can ac-
cess and work with information assets, resources, and 
systems they need, while providing the required per-
formance. Ensuring availability includes measures to 
support access to information, despite the possibility of 
interference, including system failure and deliberate at-
tempts to violate availability. The protection of access to 
and the capacity of mail service would be an example.
Ensuring availability is to identify possible points of 
failure and liquidation of these points. Strategies for re-
ducing the negative consequences of failure can be man-
agement and technology.
The  rst step is to identify potential points of failure in 
the network infrastructure. These mission-critical devices, 
such as switches and routers, as well as the basic terms 
of the functioning of servers, such as DNSs, need to be 
analyzed in terms of a possible failure and its impact on 
the functioning of the IT capabilities. This is related to risk 
management — identify and minimize risk.
From the standpoint of availability, the following de -
nitions can be given.
Reliability — the ability of a system or an individual 
component to perform its required function under cer-
tain conditions in the speci ed time period.
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Redundancy  — the creation of one or more cop-
ies (backup) systems, which are available in the event of 
primary system failure or the presence of the addition-
al capabilities of the system for the organization of its 
resiliency.
Resiliency  — method of operation, in which the 
functions of the system component (such as CPU, serv-
er, network or database) run redundant components 
in case of failure or a  planned shutdown major compo-
nent. The ability of a  system or component to contin-
ue to function normally in case of failure of equipment 
or software.
It is necessary to analyze the possible points of failure 
in the following components: data, system components, 
network topology, routers and switches, some critical 
services.
9. 125 kHz RFID Sni  ng
The purpose of this practice is to consider the work of 
EM-Marin (EM4100 or EM4102) protocol for 125 kHz RFID 
and sni  it.
After the study, the students must know and be able to:
• Know EM-Marin protocol.
• Receive data from RFID.
• Sni  and analyze data from RFID.
EM4100 (EM4102, EM-Marin) is a format of contactless
radio frequency ID cards by the company EM Microelec-
tronic-Marin (one of the most popular in Ukraine).
They belong to a class of passive RFID cards, because 
they do not have a built-in power supply. They operate in 
the frequency range 125 kHz and have a unique number 
of 40-bit.
They are available in a  variety of forms (the most 
common Clamshell cards, ISO 7810 cards, key rings). 
ISO-card can be issued in addition to the magnetic 
stripe identi cation number, made by stamping, a   eld 
for the signature of the cardholder. Personalization 
ISO-cards is made by thermal printing, screen print-
ing, o set printing. Personalization Clamshell-cards are 
made using labels that are applied to all the necessary 
information.
The reader generates a  magnetic  eld frequency of 
125 kHz. Once in the magnetic  eld of the reader, the 
card receives power and begins to cyclically modulate the 
magnetic  eld of the reader signal in which its identi ca-
tion code is encrypted. The range of labels is ranging from 
5–10 to 60–70 centimeters, depending on the structural 
elements tags and readers.
Modulation method of the carrier is amplitude. Data 
encryption  — Manchester. 64 bits, including 40 bits of 
proper unique number, the special synchronization se-
quence and parity check bits are cyclically transmitted.
The main use is the control of access to the premis-
es and a  car park. A  distinctive feature of identity cards 
Em-marine is lower cost compared to other proximi-
ty-card standard (e.g., HID or Mifare).
F. Equipment and Software Components for
the Workplace.
Many manufacturers of wireless equipment insert
algorithms, but the spectrum is scanned only in the lo-
cation area of AP, thus, they do not consider particularly 
customer location. AP starts at the clear channel at the 
place of its location, which to some extent improves the 
performance of the entire network, but does not make 
it the optimal.
Usually existing wireless cards are used for col-
lecting the information, but their range of visibility 
is often limited only by the IEEE 802.11 standard net-
works (and some maps do not even see “hidden” net-
works). Because universal method should consider 
the use of additional independent devices (spectrum 
analyzers).
For conducting good practice our course o ers 
a spectrum analyzer for separate scheme. The control unit 
implemented on Arduino Nano v3.0 (with 3.3V supply) 
and the receiver — on TI CC2500+PA+LNA module with 
external antenna. Scheme is equipped with OLEDs 0.96” 
128×64 I2C and SPI SSD1306 for visualizing the measure-
ment results. The program is written in Arduino IDE and 
compiled with GCC.
The Fig. 7 shows a diagram of the connection mo dule 
and power to the device. This device can be operated 
with a  controller that receives data via a  USB interface 
(the virtual COM port). On two screens displayed range 
of 2400.01–2503.40 MHz with spacing in 405.5 kHz. And 
Fig.  8 shows an example of display device assembly in 
a transparent case.
It was found that the control unit memory is not 
enough (only 2 KB of RAM) to analyze the available chan-
nels. Also, this device does not ful ll one of the require-
ments — must be non-directional antenna, and the half-
wave dipole has a distinct polarization.
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To implement the analyzer on a  single chip Polo-
lu Wixel has been selected, whose RAM size is 4 KB, the 
non-directional antenna,  ve times lower power con-
sumption, almost one and a half times better resolution 
and SDK with detailed documentation.
Spectrum analyzer on PololuWixel (CC2511F32) with 
SPI and/or I2C OLED’s SSD1306. The spectral width is 
2403.47–2476.50 MHz with spacing in 286.4 kHz on two 
SPI displays. Displays available channels on I2C display. 
This scheme takes less than 10mA (on 5V).
Prototype can be assembled in a clear acrylic case for 
Raspberry Pi, but can be built more compactly. Button 
with a red cap — switch on, and the second one — pause. 
The left screen displays ZigBee and Wi-Fi channels (not all 
channels fall within the available range).
So, for practice in the course “Wireless and Mobile Se-
curity” the following equipment will be used:
1. Arduino Nano v3.0.
2. TI CC2500+PA+LNA module with external antenna.
3. PololuWixel.
4. OLED’s SSD1306 SPI or I2C.
5. Raspberry Pi 3.
6. GPS module (e.g., NEO-6M).
7. UART to TTL adapter with 3.3 V levels (optionally).
8. NodeMCU (ESP-12E).
In the process of learning the course, students will ac-
quire skills to work with di erent software components: 
Kismet, AirSnort, Ettercap, Wixel SDK, Arduino IDE, WiF-
iBeaconJam, WIDS, WIPS, Aircrack and other wireless net-
work monitoring tools.
SUMMARY
The world of wireless and mobile devices is evolv-
ing day-to-day, with many individuals relying solely 
on their wireless devices at workplace and at home. 
The growing use of mobile devices demands that organ-
izations become more educated in securing this  growing 
technology and determining how to protect their as-
sets best. Using case studies and real-world events, 
it goes on to discuss risk assessments, threats, and 
vulnerabilities of wireless networks, as well as the se-
curity measures that should be put in place to mitigate 
breaches.
   Fig. 7. Schematic diagram of separated receiver and 
control unit
   Fig. 8. Separated receiver with external antenna and 
control unit
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The wireless networks consist of four basic compo-
nents: the transmission of data using radio frequencies; 
access points that provide a connection to the organiza-
tional network and/or the client devices (laptops, PDAs, 
etc.); and users. Each of these components provides an 
avenue for attack that can result in the compromise of 
one or more of the three fundamental security objectives 
of con dentiality, integrity, and availability.
Due to the intensive development of wireless net-
works course in “Wireless and Mobile Security” is very im-
portant. The course covers a comprehensive wireless and 
mobile security overview including the design, planning, 
installation, and maintenance of wireless network securi-
ty infrastructures.
The course in “Wireless and Mobile Security” provides 
knowledge in security architecture of wireless and mobile 
communication systems, information threats models, vul-
nerabilities and protection abilities in wireless networks. 
The students will obtain practical skills in penetration 
testing of wireless networks by using various protection 
methods.
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